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OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2923.55:
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY IN THE RIOT SITUATION
Ohio Revised Code section 2923.55 reads as follows:
Police officers, special police officers, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, highway
patrolmen, other law enforcement officers, members of the organized mi-
lita, members of the armed forces of the United States, and firemen,
when engaged in suppressing a riot or in dispersing or apprehending
rioters and after an order to desist and disperse has been issued pursuant
to section 2923.51 of the Revised Code, are guiltless of killing, maim-
ing, or injuring a rioter as a consequence of the use of such force as is
necessary and proper to suppress the riot or disperse or apprehend rioters.
This section does not relieve a member of the organized militia or armed
forces of the United States from prosecution by court martial for a mili-
tary offense (Emphasis supplied).
Section 2923.55 exempts law enforcement officials from liability for
killing, maiming or injuring rioters. Officials engaged in suppressing a
riot or in dispersing or apprehending rioters receive this statutory immu-
nity. The conditions for immunity are that an order to desist and dis-
perse must have been given so that it could reasonably be heard and the
killing, maiming, or injuring must have occurred by using necessary and
proper force.
The belief that deadly force is applicable to prevent a felony, or to
prevent a public disturbance has an historical, as opposed to a necessarily
rational, basis. It springs from an old common law rule which was applied
in England when practically all felonies were capital crimes.1 At that time
it was felt that deadly force could properly be used whenever a felony was
committed. Force has since been used to prevent riots or similar breaches
of the peace; however, its use has been limited to situations where it rea-
sonably appears that the riot can be prevented in no other way, and only
then if the force used is not deadly.2
Section 2923.55 replaced section 3761.15 of the Revised Code which
provided that law enforcement officials suppressing a riot were guiltless
for killing or injuring persons resisting arrest.3  Thus, the repealed sec-
tion was really a resisting arrest statute whereas section 2923.55 does not
require any particular resistance on the part of rioters.
The legislature, in enacting this new section, seems to have been
prompted by a fear of recurring riots. This led to the belief that giving
the police more support for prompt action would effectively control riots.
1 E B. HARPiE & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.19 (1956); [hereinafter cited as Harper
and James]. See also R. PERKiNs, CRIMINAL LAw 882 (1957); Perkins, Some Weak Points in
the Model Penal Code, 17 HAsT. LJ. 3, 5, 6 (1966).
2 Haper and James, § 3.19. See also Comment, Justification For the Use of Force in the
Criminal Law, 13 STAN. I. REV. 566, 577-585 (1961).
329 [1953] Laws of Ohio 144 § 8 (expired 1968).
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It was perhaps felt that the swift use of force was the only sure way to in-
sure riot control. The legislature probably intended to extend protection
and assurance for police during these situations by enabling them to pro-
tect themselves and be guiltless for the results. Paralleling the belief
that the swift use of force would stop a riotous situation before it could
develop, was the idea that this use of force would also deter others from
rioting.
Without falling prey to speculation and conjecture, it is helpful to con-
sider the probable effects of the section. From an optimistic point of view,
it is hoped that the section will aid in riot control and riot prevention.
This indeed may occur. However, many argue that wider latitudes for
police use of force may lead to more disturbances. Many riotous situations
have precipitated from police efforts to control offensive behavior. This
is not unexpected, since very few police departments carefully formulate
policies on the proper circumstances for the use of a firearm." What dis-
tinguishes an ordinary arrest from one that ignites riotous behavior has
often been a blatant exhibition of force. A riotous situation is not one
in which human behavior is readily predictable. Those involved, both as
rioters and as law enforcement officers, tend to become panicky. The re-
sult of panic is often overexuberant action and even hysteria. Evidence of
this hysteria was provided by a study which found that the typical person
shot as a looter did not have a criminal record, and often was a woman or
child.7  Behavior which leaves such shocking results is a strain upon com-
munity relations and unfortunately provides a motive for serious dis-
turbances. 8 Thus, encouraging the use of force may increase the occur-
rence of riot-provoking incidents?
Section 2923.55 may also increase the likelihood that the policeman's
4 THOMAS J. WHELAN, MAYOR OF JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY, REPORT ON LAW AND
ORDER BE3FORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, at 7 (1967), as
printed by the Ohio Legislative Service Commn. See also Wilson, Civil Disturbances and The
Rule of Law, 58 J. CRiM. L., C. & P. S., 155 (1967).
5 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
TASK FORCE ON POLICE 189 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Task Force on Police]; see also Chap-
man and Crockett, Gunsight Dilemma: Police Firearms Polky, POLICE 154 (May-June 1963).
Concerning a departmental policy on force, see R. Miller, REPORT OF AD Hoc COMMIITTEE OF
OHIO STATE UNrVERSITY CHAPTER, AmRICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE BRUTALITY TO STUDENTS DURING EMPLOYEE
STRIKE, OCTOBER 4, 5, 6, 1967. [Unpublished, available at The College of Law, The Ohio State
University].
8 HOWARD R. LEARY, POLICE COMMISsIoNER, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, REPORT ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMm'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1967),
as printed by the Ohio Legislative Service Comm'n., at 1.
7 REPORT ON RIOT CONTROL TECHNIQUES TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF
OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, October 13, 1967, as printed by the Ohio Legislative Service Comm'n
at 14 [hereinafter cited as Report on Riot Control Techniques].
8 TASK FORCE ON POLICE supra note 5, at 187.
9 Hcarings on H.R. 421 Before the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
134 (1968).
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role in our society will be misplaced. The policeman's role is to initiate
the legal process. This function is based upon a need for protection from
criminals seeking to endanger society in some way. Such a role is pri-
marily protective, and not designed to make our police public avengers
who are to seek out and destroy all whom they believe endanger society.
Our system of justice divides various functions of the legal process among
several groups. The prosecution has the function of charging suspects
with conduct it has determined is violative of the law. The jury has the
function of deciding whether that conduct is factually proven in a court of
law. The judge has the function of expressing what conduct does in fact
violate the law. Admittedly, the law has determined that in certain situa-
tions it is necessary for the policeman to act for the entire legal system-
even the executioner. However, this should be the exception and not the
rule. It is undesirable for our police to infringe upon the duties and re-
sponsibilities delegated to other groups in the legal process. Section
2923.55 may lead a policeman to take on the role of judge, jury, and exe-
cutioner by encouraging the use of force likely to cause serious bodily
harm or death. A sadistic policeman might tend to be more abusive due
to this supposed mandate. 10 Unfortunately, the heaviest brunt of this
abuse would fall on those living in the ghetto.1
There are structural problems with section 2923.55. The wording is
rather general as to the use of force. It is hoped that this generality does
not indicate that the legislature's belief was that suppressing a riot was
enough in itself to justify using deadly force.12 An example of this gen-
erality is the use of the word "guiltless," the meaning of which is not clear.
10 Comment, Kill or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation, 56 CALIF. L REV.
829, 845 (1968). [hereinafter cited as Kill or Be Killed].
11 R.W. Conant, Civil Disobedience, AMRIuCAN SCHOLAR 422 (1968); see also Rainwater,
Open Letter on White Justice and The Riots, TRANSACTION 26 (1967).
This situation has been determined to be a trait of the recent riots. Police contact in the
ghetto is commonplace. Specifically, ".. . an integral element in every riot was strain between the
police and members of the Negro community." PRESIDENTS CO'OXN ON LAW ENFORcE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACr-
AN ASSEssmENT 116 (1967).
Unfortunately, the brunt of the force may also come from sources other than police. There
is evidence showing that the ghetto resident sees the legal system itself as merely another oppres-
sor.
... the population is preyed upon by the racketeer, the vice lord, the bondsman, the
unethical attorney, and a peculiar jurisprudence, based on hundreds of years of in-
grained prejudice, which today still lacks the compassion and understanding to deal
with a culturally deprived minority in a humane manner.
Leary, The Role of the Police In Riotous Demonstrations, 40 NOTRE DAiE LAW. 499, 500-1
(1965); see also J. Hundley, The Dynamics of Recent Ghetto Riots, 45 J. URBAN L. 627, 630
(1968); V. J. Rinella, Police Brutality and Racial Prejudice: A First Close Look, 45 J. URBAN L
773 (1968); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvISORY COMM'N ON CML DISORDERS 300-1
(1967).
For an analysis of the discretion the police have see Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of justice, 69
YALR L.J. 543 (1960).
12 Kill or Be Killed, supra note 10, at 836.
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Whether it includes immunity from civil as well as criminal liability can-
not easily be determined. Many states have provisions which grant im-
munity to public officials for injuries to others while suppressing a riot.
Some use the term "guiltless" and are simply expressed, while others re-
quire some kind of resistance from the suspect before injuring or killing
him would be covered. Some emphasize that necessary and proper means
must have been employed by the official. This brings out another distinc-
tion in the Ohio provision. Section 2923.55 requires that "such force as is
necessary and proper," (emphasis added), be used by an official to be ex-
empt. The provisions of other states do not use the word "force." This
may indicate that other means are not included within the Ohio section.
Using "means" rather than "force" would appear to suggest a feeling that
more desirable methods are available than just force.
Some "guiltless" provisions have been repealed. New Hampshire re-
pealed its provision and did not enact a similar exemption at all. The
Virginia legislature repealed its section and enacted one to replace it. Al-
though it uses the word "guiltless," the new Virginia section has a positive
approach. The first line reads as follows:
Every endeavor must be used, both by the sheriff or other officers and by
the officer commanding any other force, which can be made consistently
with the preservation of life .... 13
A Connecticut exemption provision expressly includes ... all civil or crim-
inal liability therefor."' 4 The Judiciary Committee of the House of Rep-
resentatives recommended to the General Assembly that relief from both
criminal and civil liability be enacted. 5 But, in its final form, the Act
contained the word "guiltless" instead. The choice of the word seems to
be the result of compromise. It was the word used in the repealed im-
munity section involving resisting arrest., A definitive interpretation of
this legislative compromise awaits adjudication.
Another structural problem with section 2923.55 is a lack of definite-
ness concerning the words "riot" and "rioters." The section does not de-
fine riot, nor does it refer to another section for a definition. Even the
common law definition of riot may apply. Although all Ohio criminal
13 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-254.9 (Supp. 1968).
14 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-171 (Supp. 1969).
15 Report of the Standing Committee pursuant to H.R. No. 157 to the House of Representa-
tives, 107th GENmERAL ASSm&BLY, February 1, 1968.
16 A current example of a provision requiring some type of resistance, although much more
precise and limited than the former Ohio provision, reads as follows:
If any of the persons so unlawfully assembled shall be killed, maimed or otherwise
injured, in consequence of resisting the judges or others in dispersing and apprehend-
ing them.. .such judges [etc.).. shall be held guiltless; Provided, such killing.. .shall
take place in consequence of the use of necessary and proper means to disperse or ap-
prehend any such persons so unlawfully assembled. [emphasis original] NBB. REV.
STAT. § 28-807 (1964).
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law is statutory, 7 when a common law word is used in a criminal statute,
the common law definition can be included in the statute. 8 Sections
2923.52 and 2923.53 define the offenses "riot in the second degree" and
"riot in the first degree." Whether section 2923.55 applies during the
conduct of riot one, riot two, both, common law riot, or other circum-
stances, is not dear.
Thus far, the discussion has been rather negative. Perhaps, the subject
matter makes this necessarily so, but there is a positive side. That side is
to suggest what should be done to place section 2923.55 in a proper per-
spective in our society and to avoid the possible dangers referred to earlier.
This involves responsible interpretation and application of the section by
legal agencies. Certain guidelines may be helpful in constructing appropri-
ate actions.
Section 2923.55 is not an open-ended provision eliminating police re-
sponsibility. The legislature provided certain limitations. A very impor-
tant limitation was the use of the words "such force as is necessary and
proper" (emphasis added). As recommended and initially presented to
the House of Representatives, section 2923.55 did not include the words
"and proper." The addition of the words seems to indicate that in the
legislature's judgment, necessary force had to be limited. Proper force is
necessarily a limitation upon the use of necessary force. To what extent
it is actually a limitation depends, in part, upon whether our law enforce-
ment officials and our courts define "proper" in an enlightened way. The
guidelines which follow are intended as an aid in defining the word
"proper."
It is hoped that all police departments will formulate written policies
which dearly limit the use of deadly force to situations of the most com-
pelling need. 9 First, deadly force should never be used upon mere sus-
picion that a crime has been committed or that a fleeing person has com-
mitted a crime.20  Emphasizing this policy would help to prevent the
irresponsible use of force which frequently occurs in the tensions of a riot
where survival instincts tend to prevail over rationality a l
17 State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490, 492, 110 N.E.2d 416, 417 (1953).
8 Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 383, 386 (1884).
The common law definition is, as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum:
... a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons assembled and act-
ing with a common intent, either in executing a lawful private enterprise in a violent
and turbulent manner to the terror of the people, or in executing an unlawful enter-
prise in a violent and turbulent manner. 77 C.J.S., Riot §1 (1952).
See also R. PERimNs, CRnmINAL LAw 346 (1957).
19 TASK FORCE ON POLiCE, supra note 8, at 189.
20 Id.
21 Report on Riot Control Techniques, supra note 7, at 3. See also Leary, The Role of the
Police in Riotous Demonstrations, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 499 (1965); V.J. Rinella, Police
Brutality and Racial Prejudice: A First Close Look, 45 J. URBAN L 773, 776 (1968); H.W.
McGee, Jr., Arrests in Civil Disturbances: Reflections on the Use of Deadly Force in Riots, 22
RUTGERS L. REV. 716 (1968).
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Second, the police departments should emphasize that an officer must
reasonably believe that the force he uses will not create substantial risks
to innocent persons.22 A major concern is to prevent innocent persons
from being harmed, and a police officer should be highly selective in
using force. A police policy which stressed that using deadly force was
only proper when risks to innocent persons would not be increased would
greatly enhance the protective role of the law enforcement officer. This
suggested guideline, in particular, touches the heart of the police function
in our society.
Third, it should be made known that deadly force should be restricted
to the apprehension of offenders who, while committing a crime, have
used or threatened the use of deadly force. This guideline should include
the policy that the use of deadly force is restricted to situations where
the officer believes there is a substantial risk that the suspect will use
deadly force upon others if he is not apprehended immediately.23 Practi-
cal use of this policy will emphasize that the officer should not use deadly
force to prevent escape unless he reasonably believes that the fleeing sus-
pect will be a threat to use deadly force upon others if allowed to escape.24
Whereas, the second guideline was concerned with whether innocent per-
sons would face an increased risk of harm by the policeman's use of force,
this guideline refers to the risk of harm imposed upon innocent persons by
the fleeing suspect. It should be made clear that if a fleeing suspect does
not meet this specification, society's interest is better served by permitting
the escape. The escape of one sufficiently unlikely to cause a substantial
threat to innocent persons is more desirable than to misplace the protective
role of the policeman.25
These guidelines2 should be applied together if they are to be effec-
tive. It is hoped that they will be of assistance in the formulation of
realistic and practical policies concerning the use of force in riotous situa-
tions, and in the interpretation of section 2923.55 by the courts.
A. Mark Segreti, Jr.
For specific proposals concerning proper training and approach techniques to increase police
riot control effectiveness, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMi'N ON CIVIL DIs-
ORDERS 484-527 (Bantam ed., 1967); Leary, supra this note, at 503.
For a brief summary of riot causation and its implications for law enforcement, see J. R.
Hundley, Jr., The Dynamics of Recent Ghetto Riots, 45 J. URBAN L 627, 638 (1968).
22 MODEL PENAL CODE §3.07(2)(b)(iii), (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). See also, Kill
or Be Killed, supra note 10, at 852.
2 3 Task Force on Police, supra note 8, at 189.
24 Kill or Be Killed, supra note 10, at 850.
25 Id. at 845.
26 These guidelines are not meant to be exclusive. See TASK FORCE ON POLICE, sopra note
5. Also, these guidelines are not directed to police departments to the exclusion of the courts and
the legislatures. Similar proposals would be a recommended basis for the enactment of a statute
on the use of force by police, generally, as well as in the riot situation. See also, Kill or Be Killed,
supra note 23.
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